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Abstract: This paper decomposes public spending and tax revenue into various sub-
categories and estimates the impact of each of them on economic growth. The results 
provide some support for theoretical models of endogenous growth. Specifically, the 
main findings are: a) government spending on education, health and fuel-energy display a 
hump-shaped relationship with per capita growth; b) public expenditures on housing-
community amenities, social security-social assistance and transport-communication are 
characterized by a U-shaped relation with growth; c) the effect of public spending on 
education and social expenditures on growth is stronger the poorer a country is, while the 
opposite is true for expenditures on health; d) there is a non-linear impact of distortionary 
taxation on growth, but the form on non-linearity is sensitive to changes in estimation 
method, since sometimes we find a hump-shaped and sometimes a U-shaped relationship; 
e) budget surplus has a positive effect on growth. These results are derived by estimating 
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1.       INTRODUCTION 
Endogenous growth models are widely used in macroeconomics mainly because 
they are consistent with the fact that the growth rate of output, the capital-output ratio, the 
real interest rate etc. are constant over time (see Kongsamut et al., 2001). This literature 
also stresses the role of economic policy in the long-run growth process. Different 
authors have focused on different types of policy as engines of balanced growth (see 
Section 2 for details).  
Much empirical work has been done to test the predictions of theoretical models, 
but the results differ greatly between various studies. Levine-Renelt (1992) have 
emphasized the sensitivity of the findings to changes in the set of control variables. The 
same point was made by Agell et al. (1997) using data for 23 OECD countries for 1970-
1990. They initially showed that average annual growth rate is negatively related to the 
average share of tax revenues in GDP. However, when they included initial GDP per 
capita and the share of population younger than 15 and older than 65 as explanatory 
variables, the relation between taxes and growth turned positive. A problem with most of 
such studies is that they do not test the effects of fiscal policy taking into account the 
structure of both taxation and expenditure, i.e. they focus on the one side of government 
activity ignoring, at least partially, the other (Easterly-Rebello 1993, Cashin 1995, 
Devarajan et al 1996, Trish 1997). A notable exception is Kneller-Bleaney-Gemmell 
(1999, 2001) (KBG from now on), who, following Helms (1985) among others, 
recognized that any study, which does not take into account both sides of the budget, 
suffers from substantial biases of the coefficient estimates. KBG (1999) confirmed this 
point for a panel data set for 22 OECD countries covering the period 1970-1995.  
Another problem of most empirical work on the relationship between fiscal policy 
and economic growth is that not much attention is paid on distinguishing the effects of 
policy on the transition for those on the steady-state. This is important, since the 
neoclassical and endogenous growth models differ only in their predictions about the 
long-run effects of policy. The relevant conclusion in KBG (2001) is that five-year 
averaged data are not sufficient to capture the long-run effects of fiscal policy and longer 
lags are required.           2
Finally, the potential endogeneity of regressors in growth equations is not examined 
thoroughly in most papers on the effects of fiscal policy on growth. However, the 
empirical results do not seem to change when this is taken into account (KBG, 2001). 
In our work, we take the above remarks into account and refine existing research 
further, disaggregating government spending into its various components and including 
other variables potentially important for growth. We search for results that are robust to 
changes in specification and estimation method and find that some types of government 
expenditures and taxation matter for growth. Specifically, government spending on 
education, health and fuel-energy display a hump-shaped relationship with per capita 
growth. Moreover, public expenditures on housing-community amenities, social security-
social assistance (social spending) and transport-communication are characterized by a 
U-shaped relation with growth. So, education expenditures and spending on health and 
fuel-energy are beneficial for economic growth up to a point and then inhibit growth, 
while the opposite holds for spending on housing-community amenities, social security-
social assistance and transport-communication. Furthermore, the effect of public 
spending on education and social expenditures on growth is stronger the poorer a country 
is, while the opposite is true for spending on health. Also, we detect a non-linear impact 
of distortionary taxation on growth, but the form of non-linearity is sensitive to changes 
in estimation method, since sometimes we find a hump-shaped and sometimes a U-
shaped relationship between distortionary taxation and the growth rate. Finally, budget 
surplus is found to have a positive effect on growth. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic implications 
of the endogenous growth models for fiscal policy and of the government budget 
constraint for empirical testing. Section 3 summarizes the existing empirical work on 
fiscal policy and growth. Section 4 presents our data, methodology and results. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.       PREDICTIONS OF GROWTH MODELS WITH FISCAL POLICY         
Neoclassical growth models imply that government policy can affect only the 
output level but not the growth rate (e.g. Judd, 1985). However, endogenous growth 
models incorporate channels through which fiscal policy can affect long-run growth (see 
e.g. Barro 1990, Barro-Sala-i-Martin 1992, 1995).     3
The latter models classify generally the fiscal policy instruments into: a) 
distortionary taxation, which weakens the incentives to invest in physical/human capital, 
hence reducing growth; b) non-distortionary taxation which does not affect the above 
incentives, therefore growth, due to the nature of the utility function assumed for the 
private agents; c) productive expenditures that influence the marginal product of private 
capital, henceforth boost growth; d) unproductive expenditures that do not affect the 
private marginal product of capital, consequently growth.  
The endogenous growth models predict that an increase in productive spending 
financed by non-distortionary taxes will increase growth, whilst the effect is ambiguous if 
distortionary taxation is used. Also, an increase in non-distortionary spending financed by 
non-distortionary taxes will be neutral for growth, while if distortionary taxes are used 
the impact on growth will be negative.         
Various extensions of the basic endogenous growth models have been worked out, 
allowing publicly-provided goods to be productive in stock or flow form (see e.g. Cashin 
1995), different forms of expenditure to be productive (e.g. Devarajan et al. 1996, Sala-i-
Martin 1997, Glomm-Ravikumar 1997, Kaganovich-Zilcha 1999), various forms of 
taxation (Ortigueira, 1998), asymmetric equilibria ex-post (e.g. Glomm-Ravikumar 1992, 
Chang 1998) etc.     
Turning to the specification issue mentioned in the introduction of the paper, we 
refer shortly to the analysis by KBG (1999) (for details see pp. 174-175 of their paper). 
They basically concluded that the equation being estimated typically by the researchers 
who investigate the effect of fiscal policy on growth takes the form 













In (1),   is the growth rate of country i at time  , which is a function of non-
fiscal variables,  , and fiscal variables,  . Additionally,   and b  represent the 
constant term and the slope coefficient of the non-fiscal variable i (there are k  such 
variables) respectively. Also, c  is the coefficient of the growth impact of the variable 
, one of   fiscal variables, and c  measures the effect on growth of the lth fiscal 
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From equation (1), we see that the hypothesis test of zero coefficients for   
usually conducted in empirical studies, tests the hypothesis that c , and not 
, as implicitly assumed. So, we actually estimate the impact of a change in one 
fiscal variable when there is an offsetting change in the omitted   fiscal variable, which 
implicitly finances the variation in the variable of interest. If the omitted category is 
modified, the coefficient of   will be different. This implies that the researcher has 
either to omit a fiscal instrument with negligible effect on growth, i.e. one for which 
, or to omit two fiscal variables for which the hypothesis that c  can not be 
rejected. So, it is necessary to test down from the full-fledged specification to less 
complete specifications omitting only variables with negligible growth effects. 
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3.  PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORK 
Many studies of the relationship between fiscal policy and growth were conducted 
before the relevant endogenous growth models were developed, i.e. from the early 1980s. 
For example, Landau (1983) using cross-sectional data from 104 countries found a 
negative relation between public consumption as share of GDP and growth per capita 
using Summers-Heston data, while Kormendi-Meguire (1985) using cross-section/time-
series data for 47 countries found no statistically significant relation of the same variables 
for the post-World War II period. Barth-Bradley (1987) found a negative relation 
between real GDP growth and the share of consumption spending in GDP for 16 OECD 
countries for 1971-1983. Barro (1989), with data from 98 countries in the post-World 
War II period, found that government consumption decreases per capita growth, while 
public investment does not affect growth. Levine-Renelt (1992) found that most results 
from earlier studies on the relationship between long-run growth and fiscal policy 
indicators are fragile to small changes in the conditioning set.   
In the next generation of studies, Easterly-Rebello (1993) (ER from now on) used 
cross-section data for 100 countries for 1970-1988 and panel data for 28 countries for 
1870-1988. They found that public transportation, communication and educational 
investment are positively correlated with growth per capita and aggregate public 
investment is negatively correlated with growth per capita, although they admitted that 
many fiscal policy variables are highly correlated with initial income levels and fiscal   5
variables are potentially endogenous. Cashin (1995) estimated a positive relationship 
between government transfers, public investment and growth and a negative one between 
distortionary taxes and growth from panel data for 23 developed countries between 1971 
and 1988. Devarajan et al (1996) showed that public current expenditures increase 
growth, whilst government capital spending decreases growth in 43 developing countries 
over 1970-1990. Kneller et al. (1999, 2001) showed that the biases related to the 
incomplete specification of the government budget constraint present in previous studies 
(see section 2 above) are significant and after taking them into account, they found for a 
panel of 22 OECD countries for 1970-1995 that: (1) distortionary taxation hampers 
growth, while non-distortionary taxes do not; (2) productive government expenditure 
increases growth, while non-productive expenditure does not; (3) long-run effects of 
fiscal policy are not fully captured by five-year averages commonly used in empirical 
studies. Several other studies also examined the relation of fiscal policy and growth, e.g. 
by Trish (1997), De la Fuente (1997), Brons et al. (2000). Poot (2000) in a survey of 
published articles in 1983-1998 did not find conclusive evidence for the relationship 
between government consumption and growth, while he found empirical support for the 
negative effect of taxes on growth. Also, he reported definitive results on the positive link 
between growth and education spending, while the evidence on the negative growth 
impact of defense spending is moderately strong. The final piece of evidence Poot 
presented concerns the rather robust positive association of infrastructure spending and 
growth.       
It therefore seems that there is widespread non-robustness of coefficient signs and 
statistical significance even within similar specifications for similar variables. There are 
some possible explanations for these differences. The most important, in our opinion, is 
the absence of a generally accepted theoretical framework to guide the empirical 
research. This framework would pin down the most important determinants of growth, 
being fiscal policy variables or not. If such a framework were available, we could test the 
statistical significance of the postulated fiscal and non-fiscal determinants of growth and 
avoid the omitted variable bias that our results possibly suffer. Another problem of most 
empirical studies of growth and fiscal policy concerns the misspecification of the growth 
equation in relation to the government budget constraint (for details refer to Section 2 of 
the paper and references therein).    6
In addition, existing empirical studies on fiscal policy and growth differ in terms of 
countries included in the sample, period/method of estimation and measures of public 
sector activity. Data quality is also a problem since, for example, various countries have 
different conventions for the measurement of public sector size and there are limited data 
at the required level of disaggregation. Also, the dynamic effects of fiscal policy are 
either ignored completely or not modeled carefully in existing empirical work, i.e. not 
sufficient attention is paid on distinguishing the transitional from the long-run effects of 
fiscal policy. Moreover, it is likely that there is dependence between explanatory 
variables and the rate of growth (Wagner’s law) and correlation of the fiscal variables 
with initial GDP. Furthermore, the linear structure imposed on most empirical models is 
convenient but not necessarily realistic and consistent with the underlying theory. In 
addition, examination of the sample searching for outliers as well as testing for parameter 
heterogeneity is not conducted in most studies. 
In this paper, we try to deal with most of these shortcomings. First, we include a 
richer menu of policy effects and sub-categories of spending-taxes than previous studies 
as potential determinants of growth. Regarding the misspecification of the growth 
equation related to the government budget constraint, we conduct our estimations from a 
general to specific specification by omitting variables with statistically insignificant 
growth effects. Furthermore, we test for lagged effects on growth of variables for which 
theory and intuition would suggest so and allow the data to determine the appropriate 
number of lags in static and dynamic panel data models. Besides these, we employ 
estimation methods appropriate for panel data of satisfactory quality, which however 
limits our sample in terms of both the cross-section and time-series dimensions. As for 
potential endogeneity problems arising due to Wagner’s Law, we apply GMM estimation 
techniques using predetermined values of the right-hand side variables as instruments, not 
simply IV estimation used in most of the literature. Also, we incorporate nonlinear effects 
of government spending and taxation variables on growth, whenever this is theoretically 
plausible. Furthermore, we allow for parameter heterogeneity of variables’ coefficients 
across countries. We also endogenize social spending, the single most important, 
quantitatively, component of public spending, i.e. we estimate a system of simultaneous 
equations determining jointly social spending and per capita growth. Finally, we use 
annual data, not multiple-year averages as in most of the relevant papers.          7
4.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
4.1 Data 
As mentioned in Section 2, the basic models of endogenous growth assume a 
classification of fiscal instruments into 4 types, i.e. productive/unproductive expenditures 
and distortionary/non-distortionary taxation. So, we aggregate the various types of 
expenditures and revenues in the functional classification of IMF and OECD into these 
four categories adding “other expenditures” and “other revenues” in the cases where the 
classification by these organizations is not given. Our classification is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Theoretical/Functional classification of fiscal policy instruments     
Theoretical classification  Functional classification 
Distortionary taxation   Taxes on income and profits 
  Social security contributions 
  Taxes on payroll and workforce 
  Taxes on property 
Non-distortionary taxation  Taxes on domestic goods and services 
Other revenues  Customs and import duties 
  Taxes on exports 
  Other taxes on international trade and  
Transactions 
  Other taxes 
  Non-tax revenues 
  Grants 
Productive expenditures  Social security benefits-social assistance grants 
(social spending) 
  Expenditure on public order-safety 
  Expenditure on education 
  Expenditure on health 
  Expenditure on housing-community amenities 
  Expenditure on fuel-energy 
  Expenditure on transportation-communication   8
Unproductive expenditures  Expenditure on general public services 
  Expenditure on defense 
  Expenditure on recreational-cultural-religious 
affairs  
  Expenditure on agriculture-forestry-fishing-
hunting 
  Expenditure on mining-manufacturing-
construction, except fuel-energy 
  Expenditure on other economic services 
  Expenditure on other functions 
Note: functional classifications refer to the classifications given in the data sources. 
 
The theoretical classification is done according to the definitions of the four types 
of fiscal instruments in the beginning of Section 2. However, regarding the classification 
of government spending, we will estimate the impact on growth of the various categories 
characterized as productive expenditures separately. This way, we will actually test 
whether they belong to this category.  
We use an unbalanced panel data set covering 16 OECD countries. The 
observations are annual and their number differs for each country according to data 
availability, but they are 118 in total and cover the period 1970-1997. They are from 
OECD Statistical Compendium, the SourceOECD electronic database and the IMF 
Government Finance Statistics.       
Table 2 displays the basic descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
estimations, the only difference compared to most studies being that the median is used 
instead of the mean as measure of the central tendency of the distribution of each variable 
(for variables’ definitions see the Appendix). We see that the per capita income of the 
countries in our sample grew at about 2.2% per annum. Spending on education and health 
is about the same, approximately 5.5% on each of them. Social spending was almost three 
times as much, about 14%, while spending on transport-communication was around 2.6% 
of GDP. Public expenditures on housing-community amenities and fuel-energy were 
equal to 1.2% and 0.3%. Besides these, government spending on public-order safety and 
defense amounted to 1.6% and 2.6% of GDP respectively, while general public services,   9
non-productive expenditures and other expenditures accounted for 3.2%, 14.9% and 5.5% 
of GDP respectively. These expenditures were financed mainly by distortionary taxes, 
which amounted to 22.3% of GDP, non-distortionary taxes and other revenues equal to 
9.9% and 13.8% of GDP respectively. The budget was on surplus of 2%. However, for 
most variables there is huge variation between countries, as is evident from the last three 
columns of Table 2. For example, growth ranges from –2.6% to 6.2%, social spending 
from 2.4% to 21.1% of GDP, spending on education can be as low as 3.8% and as high as 
8.1% of GDP and health expenditures are between 3.4% and 7%. Furthermore, 
distortionary taxation is from 12.5% to 30.5% and we observe deficit equal to 13.4% and 
surplus of 17% of GDP. 
As far as the non-fiscal variables are concerned, the degree of openess was 50.6%, 
investment spending was around 21.3% of GDP, labour force participation was 71.3%, 
and employment growth was only 0.6% per year. Also, the replacement ratio was rather 
low, 24.6%, while the wage share and dependency ratio were equal to 63.5% and 85.9% 
respectively. However, in all cases there is large variation in the value of these variables 
across countries.      
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
























SSY  0.14007 0.039106 0.023948  0.21136   10
(Belgium) (Denmark) 
























































IY  0.21313 0.030906 0.15779 
(Belgium) 
0.29361 
(Portugal)   11























4.2.1 Specification  
4.2.1.1 A benchmark equation 
Before we analyze the models of interest, we will estimate a benchmark equation in 
the spirit of the basic regression in Barro-Sala-i-Martin (1995, BS from now on) to check 
if our results resemble those of the authors. The difference of our work with that of BS is 
that we focus on the effect of economic policy variables on growth, instead of searching 
for the determinants of growth in general.  
We use a framework that relates the per capita growth rate to two types of 
variables: a) initial levels of variables, initial GDP per capita in our case; b) control 
variables, some of which are chosen by governments and others by private agents, such 
as private investment, government expenditure on education, total government spending, 
an index of international competitiveness and an interaction term of initial GDP per 
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(2)   12
where YG is growth of per capita income, Y0 stands for initial income per capita (both in 
$US and 1990 prices/exchange rates), Y0EDY=Y0*EDY is an interaction term, EDY 
represents public education spending as fraction of GDP, IY, GY stand for investment and 
total government expenditures as percentages of GDP respectively. The inclusion of 
Y0EDY tests the hypothesis that the effect of education spending on growth differs with 
the level of initial GDP per capita. Finally, ULC is an index of international 
competitiveness (for details on definitions of variables, data sources etc. see the 
Appendix). 
Also, most variables are assumed to have both contemporaneous and lagged effects 
on growth and the summation operators are used to capture their long-run (cumulative) 
impact on growth. In this context,  c b ,..., 0 =  is the number of periods (years in our case) 
during which EDY, IY, GY, and ULC  influence growth. The estimation results are 
presented in Section 4.3.1. 
 
4.2.1.2 Single-equation model 
Equation (2) is not very informative for our purposes, since we want to test the 
predictions of endogenous growth models about the relationship of the structure of public 
spending/taxation and economic growth. In contrast, equation (2) includes only a few 
components of government spending and excludes taxation completely. As a result, our 
estimation procedures for (2) suffer from the misspecification of the budget constraint 
problem analyzed in Section 2.      
So, we proceed in the spirit of KBG (1999, 2001), but refine their work in several 
ways. First, in the equation to be estimated, we include all the elements of the 
government budget constraint for which we were able to get sufficient data and 
decompose government expenditures. Furthermore, we would like to test whether the 
effects on growth of unproductive government expenditures financed by non-
distortionary taxation are statistically insignificant as implied by the theories of 
endogenous growth. Our only problem is that we do not have a sufficient number of 
observations on net borrowing to include this component of fiscal policy in the equation 
to be estimated and we omit it. However, in the first two models estimated, we use non-
distortionary taxation and non-productive expenditures as implicit financing elements of 
a change in the rest of the fiscal variables. We confirm the hypothesis that unproductive   13
government spending and non-distortionary taxation have non-statistically significant 
coefficients, therefore they share a common coefficient in (4). So, we impose a zero 
coefficient on both variables and omit them from the models presented below.
1  
Additionally, we incorporate initial GDP per capita terms as a fourth degree 
polynomial according to recent results of a nonlinear relationship between growth and 
initial income to isolate possible convergence effects (see Kalaitzidakis et al, 2001). We 
also include a measure of business cycle fluctuations, BC, to capture business cycle 
effects on growth.
2 Also, we include investment as proportion of GDP, IY, and 
employment growth, EMG, in our equation, since capital and labour are the main factors 
of production in all growth models. Furthermore, we take into account the impact of 
labour force participation, LFP, including it separately in our model, while KBG use 
labour force growth instead. We use the same index of competitiveness, ULC, as in (3) to 
account for external effects on the economy.  
Also, we use the following interaction terms: SY=SSY*Y, EY=EDY*Y, HEY=HY*Y, 
where SSY is social spending as fraction of GDP, Y is GDP per capita in $US and 1990 
prices/exchange rates and EDY, HY stand for government spending on education and 
health respectively as a proportion of GDP. The inclusion of these terms tests the 
hypotheses that the impact of expenditures on social security-social assistance, education 
and health varies with the GDP per capita of the countries. This way, we allow for 
heterogeneity of the coefficients of government spending on education, health and social 
services across countries. 
Besides these, we use the squares of the government spending variables assumed to 
be productive to test the theoretical prediction of many endogenous growth models for 
non-linear effects of these variables on growth (see BS, Devarajan et al., 1996). The same 
non-linear form is used for distortionary taxation in order to investigate possible non-
linear growth effects of distortionary taxes. The general form of these newly constructed 
variables is  X X X * 2 = , where X is the original variable.  
In the second version of the estimated equation, we incorporate a lagged GDP per 
capita growth term, i.e. we estimate a dynamic panel model. Finally, we use the sums of 
                                                           
1 For space considerations all estimation results are not reported, but they are available from the author 
upon request.   
2 The business cycle variable was constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.    14
contemporaneous and lagged values of most right-hand side variables to detect their long-
run impact on growth (see discussion in Section 4.2.1.1).      
Consequently, the equation used to examine empirically the impact of fiscal policy 
on growth in Section 4.3.2 is the following: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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In (3), YG is the growth of GDP per capita and the fiscal policy variables are 
defined as follows:  
SSY: Social spending/GDP 
OTY: Other revenues/GDP  
OGY: Other expenditure/GDP 
BY: Budget surplus/GDP 
DTY: Distortionary taxation/GDP  
EDY: Expenditure on education/GDP 
HY: Expenditure on health/GDP 
HSY: Expenditure on housing-community amenities/GDP 
POY: Expenditure on public order-safety/GDP 
ENY: Expenditure on fuel-energy/GDP 
TCY: Expenditure on transportation-communication/GDP    
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4.2.1.3 Simultaneous-equations models 
In addition to the single-equation models analyzed above, we estimate a system of 
simultaneous equations, where the first equation is (3) and in the second equation we 
endogenize the social spending variable SSY (see Bellettini-Ceroni, 2000). We proceed 
in this way for three reasons. 
First, our analysis corresponds to the two stages we typically follow when we study 
growth models with policy. In the first stage, we solve the agents’ problem who 
maximize their utility choosing the variables of interest and take economic policy as 
given. This is the decentralized competitive equilibrium. This stage corresponds to the 
estimation of equation (3) with the single-equation methods outlined above. In the second 
stage, policy makers optimize with respect to the policy instruments (social spending in 
our case) taking into account the decentralized competitive equilibrium. This stage is 
implemented by endogenizing social spending using simultaneous-equations methods. 
The second reason for undertaking the estimation of a simultaneous-equations model is to 
increase the efficiency of our estimates relative to the single-equation models and the 
third reason is to check the robustness of the results obtained by single-equation methods.  
Regarding the specification of the social spending equation, according to Atkinson 
(1999) the level of social spending is affected by the replacement rate (average 
benefit/average wage), the wage share (average wage/GDP per worker) and the 
dependency ratio (recipients/workers). As a consequence, social spending can be high 
due to either high generosity of the welfare state system (replacement rate) and/or a high 
wage rate relative to GDP per worker and/or a large number of people who receive 
welfare benefits (dependency ratio). Thus, it is not necessary that a high level of social 
spending coincides with a generous welfare state system, i.e. a high replacement rate.
3 In 
this framework of analysis, we use the replacement rate, the wage share and the 
dependency ratio as determinants of the social spending (see also Razin et al. 2001, 
2002).  
Furthermore, Rodrik (1998) pointed out that there exists a positive correlation 
between the exposure of an economy to international trade and the size of its government, 
as given by various measures of public spending as share of GDP. The explanation he 
                                                           
3 This point is also relevant if the benefit generosity is believed to have an adverse impact on economic 
behaviour.   16
gave for this empirical regularity is that government spending provides social insurance 
against external risk. An associated hypothesis is that the risk-reducing role of 
government spending is most prominent in the context of social spending, especially in 
the advanced countries, which have greater administrative capability to maintain welfare 
systems than the developing countries. He also confirmed these hypotheses empirically 
for a large sample of low and high-income countries. Following this rationale, we 
incorporate an index of the openness of the economy, OPEN, in the equation of the 
determinants of social spending. This is included in summation form and reflects our 
belief that the impact of openness on growth has a long-run character.     
In addition, we include the initial GDP per capita in the social spending equation to 
test whether initial conditions play a role in the determination of social spending. Finally, 
we incorporate one variable capturing business cycle effects, BC (it is the same as the one 
used before in the estimation of equation (3)), and another variable measuring trend 
growth, TR. This way we isolate the influence of business fluctuations and growth on 
social expenditure.    
Furthermore, since previous empirical evidence suggests that there are lagged 
effects of fiscal policy, in order to distinguish the effects of policy during transition from 
those on the steady state, we use sums of contemporaneous and lagged values of the 
relevant variables in our models. Following the same rationale, we allow most non-fiscal 
variables to have lagged effects on growth.  
With those mentioned above in mind, we will estimate in Section 4.3.3 the 
following system of equations:  
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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In order to estimate equations (2)-(3), we first apply standard static panel 
econometric techniques.
4 We use these methods in an effort to overcome estimation 
problems that arise in cross-section growth empirics and may bias the coefficient 
estimates, i.e. omitted variables, endogeneity and measurement errors. Also, panel data 
contain a larger amount of information relative to time-series or cross-section data, 
thereby increasing the efficiency of the estimates obtained. 
Specifically, in the presence of persistent heterogeneity across countries, arising 
from differences in initial technology level or country-specific historical and cultural 
factors, which are unobservable and, therefore, omitted from the specifications to be 
estimated, the estimates will be biased if the explanatory variables are correlated with 
these factors. The problem may be represented by  , where      
 (5) is the error term in equation (1) (see Section 2),   countries, 
 time periods. Panel data estimation deals with this problem in various ways, 
which differ in the treatment of  . We first use the “fixed effects estimator”, which 
considers   as a time invariant unknown parameter that differs across countries. This 
constant term captures differences among countries and is estimated for each one of 
them. Afterwards, the “random effects” estimator is utilized, which assumes that country-
specific constant terms are drawn from a distribution of constant terms across countries. 
4 We do not conduct explicit econometric testing of the cross-equation overidentifying restrictions implied 
by any particular model. Also, we do not work in the RBC tradition in order to reproduce the main 
moments of the data. 
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Specifically,  i i a a η + = ,  ( )
2 , 0 ~ a i N a σ , where   is the group intercept and  a i η  is the 
error term related to country i. The error term of equation (1) given in (5) becomes now 
i it it v u η + =  and it is assumed that  ( ) ( ) 0 / / = = it it X E v
2
i a i a E . 
R
2 R
                                                           
 We estimate our models initially by OLS with White-corrected standard errors and 
select the appropriate model specification using the  -adjusted, Akaike Information 
Criterion and Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion as selection criteria
5 taking into 
account the efficiency of the parameter estimates of the various models. We choose the 
model(s) with the highest  -adjusted and the lowest absolute value for the two 
information criteria (see Greene, 1993) which are also superior in terms of efficiency of 
the parameter estimates. Then, we estimate the chosen models using fixed effects 
(LSDV) and random effects (GLS) estimators, and conduct F-tests for equal intercepts 
between countries and Hausman specification tests for the selection of the proper 
specification of the constant term (fixed effects vs. random effects).  
In addition to these estimation methods, we employ GMM to our panel data set.
6 
We estimate two versions of GMM for each of our models. In the simple one, we assume 
that the errors are serially independent and conditionally homoscedastic (henceforth 
GMM1). This coincides with 2SLS in the case of single-equation models and 3SLS when 
we estimate simultaneous-equations models. In the more complicated version, we allow 
for conditional heteroscedasticity and autocorrelated disturbances of second order, which 
we call GMM2 from now on. After estimating our equations with both versions of GMM, 
we perform a specification test of our models testing the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions.
7 Only models that pass this specification test will be presented.
8 
5 It is hard to derive adequate selection criteria for the conditioning variables, see e.g. Bellettini et al, 2000. 
6 GMM is a semiparametric estimation procedure, i.e. it does not require a complete knowledge of the 
probability distribution of the data. Specifically, in order to increase the amount of information in the form 
of moment conditions that our estimator exploits, we increase the number of moment conditions so that it is 
larger than the number of parameters to be estimated. Afterwards, we minimize the properly normalized 
distance between the theoretical moments and their empirical counterparts. So, our estimator depends on 
the distance matrix and the instrumental variables we use to construct the empirical moment conditions. 
The GMM estimator (GMME) is strongly consistent and asymptotically normal. The asymptotic variance 
of the GMME depends on the distance matrix and the optimal distance matrix is the variance matrix of the 
orthogonality conditions. So, we estimate the parameters of the model using the identity matrix and then 
compute the variance matrix of the orthogonality conditions. We then estimate the parameters again using 
the estimated variance matrix and compute new values for the parameters until a convergence criterion is 
fulfilled.     
7 This test was introduced by Sargan (1958) and extended by Hansen (1982) (see Baltagi, 2001).   19
Since we introduce the possibility of lagged effects of the independent variables on 
growth, we allow the data to determine the appropriate number of lags. However, static 
panel estimation methods may generate biased and/or inefficient coefficient estimates 
when applied to panels with predetermined right-hand-side and/or lagged dependent 
variables due to the potential endogeneity of the conditioning variables. To overcome 
such problems, we employ instrumental variables. We use predetermined values of the 
explanatory variables and lagged growth as instruments, thus exploiting the time-series 
dimension of our panel data set (see Judson-Owen 1999, Bun-Kiviet 2001 for a 
discussion of dynamic panel data estimation).      
Finally, we estimate jointly the system (3)-(4) by GMM1, GMM2, i.e. the same 
versions of GMM with the single-equation case. We employ simultaneous equation 
methods, since the joint estimation of a system of equations gives in general more 
efficient estimates compared to the estimation of each equation separately.      
 
4.3 Empirical results 
4.3.1 Benchmark equation 
Following the methodology described in Section 4.2 and based on the findings of 
Jones (1995), Kocherlakota-Yi (1997) and KBG (2001) (see KBG, 2001 for a review of 
the empirical literature) we estimate (2) with a maximum of 7, 8, 9 periods allowed for 
the full impact of EDY, GY, IY and ULC on growth. This implies a reduction in the 
number of countries in our sample from sixteen to thirteen (see Table 3 for the countries 
included). The model selection criteria imply that the version of (2) with 8 lags best 
captures the long-run behaviour of the fiscal variables.
9 Regarding the panel data 
estimates, an F- test of the null hypothesis of common constant terms rejects this 
hypothesis and the Hausman test rejects the random effects (RE) specification in favour 
of fixed effects (FE). This is expected given the heterogeneity of the countries in our 
sample. We apply the fixed effects method and then GMM using predetermined values of 
the independent variables as instruments. The fixed effects estimates and the GMM 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 We also iterate the variance matrix of the orthogonality conditions using starting values from 2SLS or 
3SLS. By allowing for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the errors and by iterating the variance 
matrix of the orthogonality conditions, we aim at increasing the efficiency of our estimates. 
9 This is in accordance with the findings of the above authors.   20
estimates which pass the overidentifying restrictions test (see Section 4.2.2) are presented 
in Table 3. 
From Table 3, we see that public education spending affects growth positively, as 
one would expect, since it increases the human capital stock of the countries; this is in 
accordance with the results in BS. The statistically significant negative coefficient of 
Y0EDY demonstrates that the growth impact of government spending on education 
weakens the higher the initial per capita income of a country, i.e. the growth benefit of 
education is higher in initially poorer countries. This is intuitively appealing since 
education is likely to be most beneficial in countries, where the educational level of the 
population is low. It is also consistent with empirical evidence that the returns to 
education are higher in poorer countries (see Psacharopoulos, 1985).   
 
Table 3. Benchmark equation estimates 
Model 1     
Dependent variable: YG  FE GMM2 
Independent variables  Estimated  coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Estimated  coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
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Germany  -0.41265 0.183871*** 
(2.56714) 
France  -0.43584  
Italy  -0.40999  
UK  -0.44826  
Denmark  -0.41779  
Spain  -0.38794  
Portugal  -0.51022  
S. Korea  -0.14825  
Australia  -0.42125  
Norway  -0.36148  
Iceland  -0.44944  
US  -0.44513  
Sweden  -0.42625  
  d.f=80 d.f=3 
F-test of   vs. a   0 a i 0 P-value=0.0083  Overidentifying 
restrictions test   
Hausman test of RE vs. 
FE 
P-value=0.0027 P-value=0.187 
Note:* /**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Besides these, total government spending has a statistically insignificant effect on 
growth. This might reflect the fact that a large portion of government spending is 
unproductive or even if it is productive it is financed mainly by distortionary taxes (see 
Table 2) which cancels out its growth-enhancing effects.   
Furthermore, investment seems to be negatively related to growth, when the 
relation is statistically significant. Although this is puzzling from a theoretical point of 
view, BS found a positive but statistically insignificant relation between growth and 
investment and concluded that the causation runs from growth to investment, i.e. 
investment is endogenous (see also KBG, 1999 for a similar result).   22
The competitiveness index has a negative impact on growth, when it is statistically 
significant. This is expected, given that a higher value of the index implies higher relative 
unit labour cost in manufacturing and deterioration in the export market position of a 
country. This is consistent with the positive effect of growth in the terms of trade on per 
capita growth found by BS.   
Finally, it seems that fixed effects and GMM imply a statistically significant 
coefficient of opposite sign for Y0. Theory and previous empirical findings (see e.g. BS, 
Cashin 1995, KBG 1999, Brons et al. 2000) suggest that the GMM result is more 
reasonable. However, the data is not definitive with respect to conditional convergence as 
predicted by the neoclassical growth models.  
As a conclusion, we could say that the results we get from (2) are broadly 
consistent with those of BS, with the exception of the effect of initial income per capita 
on growth. 
 
4.3.2 Single-equation models 
We estimate two versions of the single-equation model in (3), the second one 
including the lagged GDP growth term in addition to the terms of the first version. 
Initially, we test the hypothesis that unproductive government spending and non-
distortionary taxation are characterized by statistically insignificant coefficients and can 
not reject this hypothesis, therefore they share a common coefficient. So, we impose a 
zero coefficient on both variables and omit them from the models presented below (see 
Section 4.2.1.2 and Section 2 for details).  
We follow the methodology described in Section 4.2 and estimate the cumulative 
effects of most explanatory variables over 7, 8 and 9 periods. The preferred models 
according to the information criteria and 
2 R -adjusted are those involving nine lags, 
which is not much different from what previous authors have found (see KBG, 2001). In 
other words, it takes nine years for fiscal policy variables to have their long-run effect on 
growth. Afterwards, we estimate (3) with panel data and GMM methods. The relatively 
large number of right hand-side variables and lags implies that the number of countries 
involved in the estimations declines significantly, from thirteen to eight, in comparison   23
with the benchmark regressions, since we use an unbalanced data set.
10 The countries 
with more data are usually the richer countries, therefore the sample is more 
homogeneous than before. So, unlike the results of the previous section, F-tests can not 
reject the hypothesis of equal constant terms in the panel regressions. The random effects 
is the preferred estimation method, since both our intuition and Hausman tests imply that 
the constant term is not correlated with the explanatory variables. We report the random 
effects and GMM estimates for the preferred static and dynamic panel models in Tables 
4-5.
11 The coefficients reported are those of the summation operators of the variables, 
whenever this is implied by (3).  
 
Table 4. Static panel estimates 
Model 2       
Dependent 
variable: YG 
RE GMM1(2SLS) GMM2 
Independent 
variables 






Estimated            
coefficient 
(t-statistic) 




































                                                           
10 So, our sample now includes Germany, Italy, U.K, Denmark, Spain, Australia, Norway and U.S.A. 
11 A complete set of results is available from the author upon request. 
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IY            0.099589 























BC  0.010711*** 0.026604***  0.030733***   25
(3.23878) (2.69809) (26.6131) 

















































TCY2  115.842*** 
(3.14886) 
214.303*** 
         (2.58809) 
191.063 
(0) 
          DTY2           7.28783** 
         (2.30691) 
         16.8791** 
         (2.10567) 
          18.7844 
          (0) 
  d.f=27 d.f=3  d.f=13 
F-test of   vs.    0 d i d0 P-value=0.4362  Overidentifying 
restrictions test  
Overidentifying 
restrictions test  
Hausman test of 
RE vs. FE 
P-value=0.4014 P-value=0.620  P-value=0.992 
Note:* /**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5. Dynamic panel estimates 
Model 3       
Dependent 
variable: YG 
RE GMM1(2SLS) GMM2 
Independent 
variables 
















































































(-50.6078)   27






















































BC           0.010259*** 



































HSY2  205.399*** 311.833*** 46.3684   28
(5.13605) (3.38777) (0) 












TCY2  123.896*** 
(6.63271) 
96.0235 
          (1.14715) 
-99.8805 
(0) 












  d.f=26 d.f=8  d.f=19 
F-test of   vs.    0 d i d0 P-value=0.5708  Overidentifying 
restrictions test  
Overidentifying 
restrictions test  
Hausman test of 
RE vs. FE 
P-value=1.000 P-value=0.427 P-value=0.911 
Note:* /**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
It is to be noted that in both versions of our model, with and without lagged GDP 
growth, the second method of GMM estimation (GMM2) gives more efficient estimates 
than the first method (GMM1). This is explained by the richer structure of disturbances 
and the optimal weighting matrix used by the former estimation method in contrast with 
the latter (see Section 4.2.2 for details). However, in the specification that incorporates 
lagged growth, the RE method gives more efficient estimates than GMM2. This 
apparently unexpected result can be justified by the relatively homogenous sample of 
countries included in the estimations, which makes unnecessary in this model the rich 
structure of disturbances and the optimal weighting matrix used by GMM2 compared 
with the RE method. Since GMM2 involves the estimation of many additional parameters 
in relation to RE, it consumes more degrees of freedom resulting in less efficient 
estimates.  
Before we comment on the results of Tables 4-5, we should note that when the 
evidence on a government spending variable implies that there might exist a inverse U-  29
shaped relationship between this variable and growth, there is an optimal (growth-
maximizing) level of this type of expenditures. In other words, when spending is lower 
than this level, the relevant good/service is underprovided, while when spending is higher 
we have overprovision (see e.g. Barro 1990, Karras 1996, Brons et al 2000). So, when a 
spending category is found to have in some studies e.g. a negative growth effect, this 
might simply mean that it is provided in a scale larger than the optimal and not that it is 
generally bad for growth. In the cases where the results are not in favour of a non-linear 
relation, this might simply reflect the fact that the data points are clustered around the 
upward-sloping or downward-sloping part of the functional relationship. 
 
Public expenditures on human capital    
We begin the discussion about policies, which affect human capital accumulation, 
i.e. the quantity and quality of human capital, by noting that the conclusions are clear in 
most estimations which yield statistically significant results.  
The most conclusive evidence exists with respect to government education 
expenditures. Education spending exhibits a statistically significant positive relationship 
with growth up to point and at higher levels of expenditures it seems, the evidence is 
quite robust, that it has a negative impact on growth. The growth-maximizing share of 
expenditure on education in GDP is between 6.6% and 7.6% for all but one estimate. So, 
the median value of this variable on our data (5.3%) is below the optimal level and this is 
confirmed by the positive effect of median education spending on growth, which means 
that a 1% increase of this type of expenditure as a share of GDP implies an increase in 
GDP growth between 3% and 9.8%. These effects are stronger the poorer a country is 
(see Tables 4-5 for the results).  
Regarding public spending on health, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship with 
growth in most cases. The share of government expenditure on health, which maximizes 
growth, is estimated between 5.8% and 7.7%, which is higher than the median value of 
5.5% actually observed. This causes an increase of 1% as a share of GDP to lead to a 1%-
22% increase in GDP growth. Moreover, the effect of health expenditures seems to be 
stronger the richer a country is, although the relevant variable, HEY, is not statistically 
significant most of the time. This sort of impact suggests the possibility of positive   30
externalities of better nutrition, housing and social infrastructure in wealthier countries on 
health spending.    
Third, strong evidence exists for public expenditure on housing and community 
amenities, for which the relation with growth is of the U-shaped type, when it is 
statistically significant. So, this type of spending lowers growth initially up to a minimum 
and then it is growth-enhancing. This is an indication of economies of scale in the 
provision of social infrastructure. The level of housing spending, which minimizes 
growth is estimated at 1.4% to 2.1%. The lower median expenditure on housing (1.2%) 
explains the negative impact of this type of spending on growth at its median value 
estimated between 1.1% and 11.8% decline in growth for every 1% increase in housing 
spending as share of GDP.   
These findings are partially consistent with the positive effects of government 
education expenditures reported in the review paper of Poot (2000), and similar effects of 
productive public spending (which includes expenditures on education, health and 
housing-community amenities) in KBG (1999, 2001). In addition, Trish (1997) found 
positive growth impact for education, health and housing spending. At the same time, our 
evidence implies non-linear effects of these types of spending on growth, which is 
sensible both theoretically (see e.g. BS, Brons et al., 2000) and empirically (Karras 1996, 
Kalaitzidakis et al, 2001). Also, the above results are somewhat consistent with the 
difficulty of Devarajan-Swaroop-Zou (1996, DSZ from now on) to get statistically 
significant estimates for health and education spending. However, Hanushek-Kimko 
(2000) found that although labour-force quality is important for growth and quality 
differences are related to schooling, these differences are not due to the resources devoted 
to schooling (see also Bils-Klenow, 2000), contrary to our results for a positive influence 
of public education expenditure on growth up to a level of spending.    
 
Social Spending   
The single-equation results regarding social spending are not very conclusive. In all 
six equations estimated the linear term is statistically significant and in four of them it is 
positive. The respective quadratic term is positive the only time when it is statistically 
significant, implying a U-shaped relationship of social spending and growth. This 
confirms the non-linearity hypothesis for the impact of government spending on growth   31
put forward by BS among others (see relevant discussion for human capital). The growth-
minimizing level of social spending is 10.9% of GDP. The fact that median social 
spending is higher (14%) explains why it has a positive growth impact, i.e. a 1% increase 
in its GDP share implies a 1.1% increase in GDP growth.    
The above results for low levels of social spending are in line with the prediction of 
many growth models that redistributive policies have a depressing effect on physical 
capital accumulation and growth. For high levels of social expenditures, however, the 
findings are consistent with theoretical models implying that social security spending 
may e.g. positively influence savings, the level and productivity of physical and human 
capital investment, employment, international competitiveness and growth (see e.g. 
Bellettini-Ceroni, 2000, BC from now on, Lau et al., 2001 and Van Der Ploeg, 2003). On 
the empirical front, for high levels of spending our results confirm the findings of BC and 
Cashin (1995) who find a positive association of spending on social security and growth. 
But for low levels of social expenditures our evidence is in line with the theoretical 
predictions of Feldstein (1974). Atkinson (1999) in a survey of the literature concluded 
that the evidence on the relationship between the size of the welfare state and growth is 
mixed. But, our evidence might imply that a critical level of social spending must be 
reached before its beneficial impact outweighs its negative effects.  
Moreover, the interaction term SY is negative and statistically significant in three 
out of six estimations implying that the influence of social spending on growth might 
weaken the higher the level of development of a country. This is consistent with the 
finding of BC that social security expenditure is most beneficial for growth in poor 
countries with an underdeveloped welfare state, e.g. low social spending.  
  
Public expenditures on infrastructure/energy 
As far as the public expenditures on transportation-communication are concerned, 
the estimation results imply an impact on growth of the U-shaped type, i.e. the effect on 
growth is negative for low levels of spending and turns positive afterwards. This is 
somewhat in line with growth models, which consider transportation and communication 
as very important ingredients of a country’s infrastructure, which imply positive 
externalities to private producers, raise their productivity, therefore enhance economic 
growth. Our results are also partially consistent with evidence from both ER, who found a   32
positive correlation of this kind of expenditure with growth, and DFZ, Trish (1997) who 
identified a negative growth impact. Our evidence might simply be explained by 
economies of scale in investments in the transportation-communication sectors. These 
imply that large scale spending is necessary before its productivity starts increasing 
leading to higher efficiency and growth in the whole economy. But before the economy 
reaches this stage, we might well have a growth depressing impact of expenditures on 
transportation-communication, due to the high initial cost of this type of infrastructure. 
The critical point where the growth effect of this type of spending turns from negative to 
positive is estimated between 3.1% to 4.5% of GDP. The median share of GDP devoted 
to transportation-communication expenditures is lower (2.6%) which is consistent with its 
negative impact on growth equal to 1.3%-9.1% for each percentage point increase in this 
type of spending as a share of GDP.     
Finally, there is some evidence of a hump-shaped relationship of public spending 
on fuel-energy and economic growth, but the respective quadratic term is not statistically 
significant in most estimations and its sign is not stable throughout the estimations. The 
only time when the quadratic term is significant, the growth-maximizing share of 
expenditure on fuel-energy is about 1% of GDP, while the median share is 0.3%, so 
growth would increase if governments increased somewhat spending on fuel-energy. 
            
Spending on public order-safety 
We include expenditure on public order-safety in our estimated equations as an 
attempt to test the view expressed in some growth models that this type of spending 
contributes to the protection of property rights increasing the probability that the citizens 
retain these rights to their goods and services (see e.g. BS). Therefore, such models argue, 
the higher spending on public order-safety is, the stronger the incentive agents have to 
accumulate human/physical capital and this enhances growth.  
However, our empirical results are not equally encouraging, since we are able to 
detect a statistically significant non-linear effect of spending on public order-safety on 
growth in only two out of six estimations. In one of these cases the estimates imply an 
inverse U-shaped relationship and in the other case a hump-shaped relationship between 
spending on public order-safety and growth. The growth-maximizing GDP share of this 
type of expenditure is 1.9%, i.e. higher than the median level observed in the data (1.6%).   33
This explains the positive growth effect of spending on public order-safety, i.e. it is 
compatible with the 11.5% increase in growth for a 1% increase in this type of 
expenditure at its median value, although the size of the impact is implausibly large. The 
growth-minimizing level of spending on public order-safety is 2.1%, so the 
corresponding growth impact is negative, equal to 3.1% for each percentage point 
increase in growth. Poot (2000) and DFZ reported insignificant or negative influence of 
defense spending on growth (this type of government expenditure could be considered to 




Looking at the revenue side of the budget, we see that distortionary taxes have a 
non-linear statistically significant impact on growth in most cases. However, the type of 
non-linearity is not clear from the estimation results, since in two cases there seems to be 
a hump-shaped relationship and in three we find a U-shaped relationship between 
distortionary taxes and growth. These conflicting results might be due to the omission of 
net borrowing, which causes biases in the estimates. Generally, the impact of taxes on 
growth is expected to be statistically significant and negative by most growth models. But 
in models with productive government spending financed by distortionary taxes, the 
inverse U-shaped relation of spending and growth implies the same relation between 
growth and taxes assuming a balanced budget. In this context, the growth-maximizing 
GDP share of distortionary taxation is between 30.8% and 45.7%.   
A related item is budget surplus, which is estimated to exert a statistically 
significant positive impact on growth in most cases. The positive growth effect is 
consistent with the theory of public finance, which argues that since a current surplus will 
finance future deficits through cuts in distortionary taxation or increases in productive 
spending, it causes an increase in the expected returns to current investment, therefore 
growth (KBG, 1999).  
As far as the remaining types of public spending and revenues are concerned, 
“other expenditures” and “other revenues”, when they affect growth statistically 
significantly, they have a negative and a positive impact respectively.   
                                                           
12 Previous empirical evidence justifies the classification of defense expenditures as unproductive 
government spending in this paper. However, it is the most closely related category to public order-safety   34
The statistically insignificant findings or coefficients with theoretically implausible 
sign shown in the analysis of the growth effects of fiscal policy might be due to an 
inappropriate classification of some expenditure types as productive/unproductive, a 
question over which there is some debate (KBG, 1999). This point will be examined later 
in more detail (see Section 4.4). Also, such results might reflect the omission of the net 
borrowing variable due to lack of data. In other words, some findings may appear due to  
the incomplete specification of the budget constraint because of data limitations (see 
discussion in Section 2). 
 
Non-policy variables 
The relationship between per capita growth and initial GDP per capita is 
statistically significant in most estimations and captured by a fourth-order polynomial 
implying a non-linear convergence effect. This is consistent with recent empirical studies 
on convergence (see Kalaitzidakis et. al, 2001).   
Moreover, investment is estimated to have a positive, mostly statistically 
insignificant, effect on growth. However, similarly inconclusive results are not 
uncommon in growth empirics, where it is sometimes argued that the causation runs from  
growth to investment and not the other way around, i.e. that investment is endogenous  
(see e.g. KBG, BS).  
As far as the labour market variables are concerned, we are not always able to 
disentangle the impact of labour force participation from that of employment growth on 
per capita growth. So, the former has a negative impact on growth and the latter a 
positive growth effect when these effects are statistically significant in all but two cases. 
Furthermore, competitiveness, measured by the ULC variable, affects growth 
negatively in one case and positively in another case, but is mostly insignificant. This in 
not theoretically plausible, since a higher value of the index, i.e. rising relative unit labour 
cost in manufacturing, should lower exports and growth. However, it is more likely that 
there are other factors except cost competitiveness which affect exports, therefore growth. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
expenditure and this is why empirical results for defense spending are mentioned here.    35
In this context, it should be mentioned that competitiveness indicators are composed of 
many factors.
13  
Also, the business cycle variable enters the equations with a statistically significant 
positive sign in most cases. This simply indicates that when the economy is booming, 
growth rate is higher than otherwise and is therefore expected. Regarding lagged GDP 
growth, it has a negative impact on current growth in accordance with previous evidence 
(KBG, 2001).    
 
4.3.3 Simultaneous-equations models 
Following the methodology analyzed in Section 4.2, we estimate jointly by GMM1, 
GMM2 the system of equations (3)-(4). Based on the single-equation estimation results, 
we use the version of (3) involving nine lags of the fiscal policy variables and estimate 
two versions of (3), the second including lagged GDP growth (Model 5) in addition to the 
right-hand side variables of the first version (Model 4). For both versions of the system 
(3)-(4), we present the results of the GMM2 estimation method, which are reported in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Simultaneous-equations estimates 
















CONSTANT  -74.1903*** 
(-4.57989) 
CONSTANT  -128.544*** 
(-39.9387) 
SSY  2.91742** 
(2.01124) 
SSY  0.649104 
(1.29399) 
                                                           
13 These have to do with the macroeconomic performance of a country, the extent to which government 
policies are conducive to competitiveness, firms perform in an innovative, profitable and responsible 
manner and the extent to which basic, technological, scientific and human resources satisfy the needs of 
businesses (see e.g. De Grawe-Polan, 2003).   36
LFP  -0.501817** 
(-2.32048) 
LFP  -0.375089*** 
(-10.3866) 
OTY  -0.474886 
(-0.939882) 
OTY  0.044891 
(0.949702) 
OGY  1.15732* 
(1.81468) 
OGY  0.038251 
(0.788117) 
BY  0.811992** 
(2.29080) 
BY  0.218215*** 
(6.30897) 
DTY  -9.12483** 
(-2.49557) 
DTY  -2.95506*** 
(-55.6962) 
EDY  38.1774*** 
(2.78774) 
EDY  12.3735*** 
(26.0796) 
HY  81.3815*** 
(2.76869) 
HY  20.8281*** 
(24.9990) 
HSY  -27.5192*** 
(-2.56899) 
HSY  -7.56575*** 
(-24.3884) 
POY  -40.7359 
(-1.25043) 
POY  -12.0995*** 
(-22.8657) 
ENY  63.5951* 
(1.71276) 
ENY  -1.41728 
(-0.992499) 
TCY  -21.4899*** 
(-2.77989) 
TCY  -8.37021*** 
(-5.48396) 
Y0  0.017815*** 
(5.32021) 
Y0  0.034356*** 
(54.9818) 
Y02  -0.197544E-05*** 
(-9.04115) 
Y02  -0.340824E-05*** 
(-81.5108) 
Y03  0.933104E-10*** 
(20.3535) 
Y03  0.146567E-09*** 
(164.814) 
Y04  -0.159127E-14 
(0) 
Y04  -0.230521E-14 
(0) 
IY  0.233617  IY  0.016969   37
(0.403810) (0.247462) 
EMG  0.352853** 
(2.23206) 
EMG  0.120691* 
(1.84794) 
ULC  0.216560E-03 
(0.967270) 
ULC  -0.478204E-04 
(0) 
SY  -0.646365E-04 
(-1.05762) 
SY  -0.204481E-04** 
(-2.34966) 
BC  0.033251** 
(2.47778) 
BC  0.011351*** 
(9.74434) 
EY  -0.139623E-03 
(-1.23417) 
EY  -0.156882E-03 
(0) 
HEY  -0.101926E-03 
(-0.605745) 
HEY  0.113380E-03*** 
(4.23906) 
SSY2  -1.42006 
(-0.241517) 
SSY2  1.37345 
(0.777291) 
EDY2  -287.292*** 
(-2.60438) 
EDY2  -81.5121 
(0) 
HY2  -541.405** 
(-2.54126) 
HY2  -173.680 
(0) 
HSY2  632.415*** 
(2.80859) 
HSY2  215.838 
(0) 
POY2  726.061 
(0.940056) 
POY2  285.022 
(0) 
ENY2  -3435.27 
(-1.39159) 
ENY2  320.771 
(0) 
TCY2  239.363** 
(2.50794) 
TCY2  134.214*** 
(5.31139) 
DTY2  18.0804** 
(2.27985) 
DTY2  6.45403 
(0) 
    YG(-1)  -0.445331*** 










  Independent 
variables 
 
CONSTANT  -0.202036*** 
(-16.7873) 
CONSTANT  -0.203816*** 
(-17.3870) 
RR  0.531873*** 
(47.7361) 
RR  0.532193*** 
(48.5052) 
WS  0.185893*** 
(13.3657) 
WS  0.188827*** 
(13.6665) 
DR  0.121845*** 
(20.6623) 
DR  0.121903*** 
(20.8469) 
OPEN  -0.118272E-02** 
(-2.36638) 
OPEN  -0.122116E-02** 
(-2.38920) 
BC  -0.401272E-03*** 
(-3.36375) 
BC  -0.389574E-03*** 
(-3.33434) 
TR  -0.164098E-05*** 
(-3.78395) 
TR  -0.161903E-05*** 
(-3.53066) 
Y0  0.112405E-05*** 
(2.84606) 
Y0  0.109398E-05*** 
(2.63016) 
  d.f=37   d.f=78 
 Overidentifying 
restrictions test  
P-value=0.146 
  Overidentifying 
restrictions test  
P-value=0.136 
Note:* /**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Looking at Table 6, we do not confirm the statement made in Section 4.2.2 on the 
increased efficiency of the system estimates of equation (3) in Table 6 relative to their 
single-equation counterparts in Tables 4-5. The efficiency loss in system estimation 
underlines the need for a more extensive search for appropriate instruments.    39
However, the findings confirm the results of the single-equation estimations with a 
few exceptions. The first is that social spending appears not to have a statistically 
significant impact on growth in one of the two models presented in Table 6, in contrast 
with the findings in Table 4, where the linear social spending term is always significant, 
although this is not the case with the quadratic term. This difference confirms that the 
relationship of social expenditure and growth is still an open question in the literature, 
both theoretically and empirically (Belletini-Cerroni, 2000). The second difference is that 
the linear coefficient of expenditure on public order-safety is statistically significant and 
negative in Model 5, while it is positive in two of the four cases, where it is significant in 
Models 2-3.  The respective quadratic term is insignificant in Models 4-5 and statistically 
significant with unstable sign in two of the six cases in Models 2-3.  The third main 
difference is that only the linear term of spending on fuel-energy is significant and 
positive in Model 4, while in Model 2 it has the opposite sign, when it is significant. The 
non-linear term is significant and negative in Model 2, while it is not significant in Model 
4. Finally, the linear term of expenditure on fuel-energy is significant and negative in 
Model 3 and insignificant in Model 5.     
Regarding equation (5), the results for the replacement ratio, wage share and 
dependency ratio are in accord with the predictions of Atkinson (1999), i.e. all these 
factors exert a positive influence on social spending. However, the openness indicator 
affects social spending negatively, which contrasts the findings of Rodrik (1998). A 
sensitivity analysis should be done in this case using alternative measures of exposure to 
external risk to check the impact of openness on welfare spending. Also, initial income 
per capita is strongly positively correlated with subsequent social spending, since initially 
rich countries have a greater administrative capacity to manage the welfare state in the 
future. Finally, a higher long-run growth rate (TR) and a booming economy (BC) imply 
lower social spending. These results could be explained by low natural unemployment 
and low cyclical unemployment, associated with high employment growth, arising from 
strong long-run growth and economic recovery. All these factors tend to reduce social 
expenditures, due e.g. to the decline in unemployment benefits. 
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4.4 Specification testing  
The lack of robustness of the estimated effects of fiscal variables on economic 
growth in previous studies is obvious from the wide range of estimates (see Section 3 for 
examples). In this section, we examine the robustness of our earlier results to the 
classification of government expenditures into the productive and unproductive 
categories. Specifically, expenditures on general public services and defense are 
considered productive and social security expenditures unproductive in some previous 
work (see e.g. KBG 1999, 2001). We try this classification in the Models 2-3 including 
public spending on general public services (GPSY, GPSY2= GPSY*GPSY) and 
government defense expenditures  (DEFY, DEFY2= DEFY*DEFY) in the productive 
public spending variables and excluding the variables related to social spending (SSY, 
SSY2 and SY) from growth-enhancing public spending. The random effects estimation 
method is selected after the relevant F-tests and Hausman tests are conducted. Our 
estimation results imply that all four new elements of productive government 
expenditures do not have a statistically significant impact on growth suggesting that these 
types of expenditures should not be included in the productive components of public 
spending. As for the other fiscal variables, although estimates change somewhat, they are 
mostly robust compared with the results presented in Tables 4-5.         
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS  
The composition of both sides of the government budget, spending and revenues, 
matters for balanced growth. This paper takes into account explicitly both sides of the 
government budget, since the policy variables in the growth regressions include both 
public revenues and expenditures. We also extend the work of KBG by disaggregating 
government spending in a more detailed way and endogenizing social spending, the most 
important, quantitatively, component of government expenditures. We find that some 
types of public spending and taxation affect growth, i.e. government spending on 
education and health displays a hump-shaped relation with per capita growth.  However, 
the impact of education spending on growth is stronger the poorer a country is, while the 
opposite holds for expenditures on health. Also, public expenditures on housing-
community amenities and social security-social assistance exhibit a U-shaped relation 
with growth and the effect of social spending on growth is stronger, the poorer a country   41
is. Moreover, expenditures on fuel-energy display a hump-shaped relationship with 
growth and government spending on transport-communication is characterized by a U-
shaped relation with growth. Furthermore, budget surplus contributes positively to 
growth, while a non-linear relationship between distortionary taxation and growth is 
detected, but its form is not robust to changes in model specification and estimation 
method.  
Regarding social spending, it is positively affected by the replacement ratio, wage 
share, dependency ratio and initial income and negatively by openness. Finally, an 
economy in a recovery period and when characterized by rapid long-run growth 
contributes to a lower social spending. 
We close with future extensions. We could update our data set including more 
recent data and more countries. We could also apply additional GMM estimation methods 
for dynamic panel data and seemingly unrelated regressions for the system of equations 
to check the robustness of our results. Finally, we might include additional variables in 
the social spending equation, like welfare benefit coverage and duration, as well as 
income distribution measures so as to test the predictions of various political economy 
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APPENDIX  
Definition of variables/Data sources 
Y: GDP per head, $US in 1990 prices and exchange rates, OECD Statistical Compendium 
1999/2. 
YG: growth rate of real GDP per capita equal to  ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 / 1 − − − Y Y Y . 
Y0: initial GDP per head, $US in 1990 prices and exchange rates, OECD Statistical 
Compendium 1999/2. 
EDY: Expenditure on education/GDP (local currency-current prices), OECD Statistical 
Compendium 1999/2, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and earlier 
issues. 
HY:  Expenditure on health/GDP (local currency-current prices), OECD Statistical 
Compendium 1999/2, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and earlier 
issues. 
HSY: Expenditure on housing-community amenities/GDP (local currency-current prices), 
OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
2000 and earlier issues. 
Social security benefits: payments made to individuals under social security schemes, 
usually out of a special fund (Glossary of Main Terms, OECD 1999). 
Social assistance grants: cash grants to individuals and households, by public authorities, 
private non-profit institutions, and corporate and quasi-corporate enterprises, except 
social security benefits and unfunded employee welfare benefits (Glossary of Main 
Terms, OECD 1999). 
SSY: (Social security benefits+Social assistance grants)/GDP (local currency-current 
prices), OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2 and earlier issues. 
TCY:  Expenditure on transportation-communication/GDP (local currency-current 
prices), OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2, IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 2000 and earlier issues. 
ENY: Expenditure on fuel-energy/GDP (local currency-current prices), OECD Statistical 
Compendium 1999/2, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and earlier 
issues.   43
GPSY:  Expenditure on general public services/GDP (local currency-current prices), 
OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
2000 and earlier issues. 
POY: Expenditure on public order-safety/GDP (local currency-current prices), OECD 
Statistical Compendium 1999/2, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and 
earlier issues. 
DEFY: Expenditure on defense/GDP (local currency-current prices), OECD Statistical 
Compendium 1999/2, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and earlier 
issues. 
NPRGY: Non-productive expenditure/GDP (Expenditure on general public services + 
Expenditure on defense + Expenditure on recreational-cultural-religious affairs + 
Expenditure on agriculture-forestry-fishing-hunting+ Expenditure on mining-
manufacturing-construction, except fuel-energy+ Expenditure on other economic 
services+ Expenditure on other functions)/GDP (local currency-current prices), (local 
currency-current prices), OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2, IMF Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and earlier issues. 
OGY:  Expenditure on other functions /GDP (local currency-current prices), OECD 
Statistical Compendium 1999/2, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and 
earlier issues. 
GY:  Total government expenditures/GDP (local currency-current prices), OECD 
Statistical Compendium 1999/2, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and 
earlier issues. 
DTY: Distortionary taxation as share of GDP (Taxes on income and profits+ Social 
security contributions+ Taxes on payroll and workforce+ Taxes on property)/GDP (local 
currency-current prices), SourceOECD electronic database 2001, IMF Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and earlier issues. 
NDTY: Non-distortionary taxation as share of GDP (Taxes on domestic goods and 
services)/GDP (local currency-current prices), OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2, 
IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and earlier issues. 
OTY: Other revenues as share of GDP equal to (Customs and import duties+ Taxes on 
exports+ Other taxes on international trade and transactions+ Other taxes+ Non-tax   44
revenues+ Grants)/GDP (local currency-current prices), SourceOECD electronic 
database 2001, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and earlier issues. 
BY: Budget surplus as a share of GDP (Tax revenues+ Non-tax revenues+ Grants- Total 
government expenditures)/GDP (local currency-current prices), SourceOECD electronic 
database 2001, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000 and earlier issues. 
LFP: Labour force participation equal to Total labour force/Population 15-64, OECD 
Statistical Compendium 1999/2. 
EM: Total employment (number of employed), OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2. 
EMG: Employment growth equal to  ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 / 1 − − − EM EM EM , OECD Statistical 
Compendium 1999/2. 
IY: Total fixed investment excluding stockbuilding/GDP (local currency-current prices), 
OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2. 
OPEN:  (Exports+Imports)/GDP (local currency-current prices), (index of openness) 
OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2. 
ULC: Relative unit labour cost in manufacturing (index of competitiveness), 
SourceOECD electronic database 2001. 
RR: Replacement ratio equal to Average Benefit/Average wage=((Social security 
benefits+social assistance grants)/(Unemployment+population under 15+population 
over 64))/Compensation per employee in private sector, OECD Statistical Compendium 
1999/2. 
WS: Wage share equal to Average wage/Average GDP per worker= Compensation per 
employee in private sector/(GDP/Total employment), OECD Statistical Compendium 
1999/2. 
DR: Dependency ratio, i.e. welfare recipients /number of workers= 
(Unemployment+population under 15+population over 64)/ Total employment, OECD 
Statistical Compendium 1999/2. 
 
List of countries 
The sample was determined by data availability and the number of countries included in 
each estimation depends on the availability of the relevant variables for each country. The 
countries included in our sample are the following:   45
Germany, France, Italy, U.K, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, S. Korea, Australia, 
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